This paper demonstrates how our sense of identity can emerge out of mere markers of social distinction that may have no innate significance, but, nevertheless, spread to various aspects of our lives and be the root of conflict. The basis of such conflicts could arise from the use of race to form conditional judgments about people's behavior. Moreover, there are contexts where racial conflict is inevitable even though, if individuals had common knowledge of one another's preferences, there would be no conflict. It is argued that this kind of conflict, where many individuals have no innate aggressive preference, is widespread and understanding the process that gives rise to such conflict is the key to crafting effective policy that contains it.
can do mathematics and those who cannot (though there is a friend of mine who believes that that is the next big clash and one that will dwarf previous ones).
Using the sociology of human life, one can narrow down the list of identifying marks that can be the source of major conflict and those that cannot. For instance, it is unlikely that there will ever be pitched battle between men and women, since they have to share living space (there will, for one, be no reason to wait to get up in the morning to fight)
2 . There is little scope for any lasting conflict between the old as a group and the collectivity of young because each of us will feel empathy for the other side, knowing that we will be (or have been) in the same boat at some time. But among the list that survives this paring down, there may be something vacuous about the ones that get chosen and acquire salience. And to the extent that the basis of conflict can undergo major shifts--what seems an unimportant distinction today may become a matter of pride and war tomorrow and vice versa. Nationalism and its concomitant, patriotism, seem a natural emotion today and to stand up for it is so often held up as noble. But I remain persuaded that, if wars do not bring the world to a premature end, there will come a time when we will find it baffling and shameful to contemplate that we once went to war for reasons of patriotism or national identity 3 . Today it seems normal to have newspapers or television channels in the U.S. count the tragedy of war by reporting the number of Americans who die each day, but we would find it abhorrent if a newspaper did the same by reporting the number of Christian Americans dying each day or the number of Whites 2 This not to deny that there is conflict between the sexes in society and even within the household, but this takes very different forms from racial conflict. The conflict between the sexes often takes place within the broad parameters of cooperative behavior, thereby inviting the label 'cooperative conflict' (Sen, 1990; Basu, 2005) . 3 A similar moral line is taken in several essays in Nussbaum and Cohen (1996) and especially the opening essay by Nussbaum (1996) which draws on some remarkable lectures given by the poet Rabindranath dying each day. But morally there is not much difference between these and hopefully there will come a time when there will be easy agreement on this and tragedies will be measured in terms of numbers of human beings who die or get hurt.
One often hears people of race X say that they have nothing against people of race Y, but the latter behave so aggressively towards them that they have no option but to fight back with aggression. As Weingast (1997) has argued in the context of Yugoslavia, the damage caused by the 'other' group's aggression can be so large that 'this' group is often compelled to preemptively act aggressively. It will be argued here that one can construct game-theoretically consistent models to illustrate such behavior. Racial conflict may emerge from no innate racial preference. The basis of such conflicts could be founded in the use of race to form conditional judgments about people's behavior. Moreover, there are contexts where racial conflict is inevitable even though, if individuals had common knowledge of their preferences, there would be none. Understanding the process that
gives rise to such conflict is the key to crafting policy to restrain such conflict. Though I do not comment directly on policy in this paper, the theory that is developed here is motivated by the need to inform policymakers about what causes identity strife and flareups and how they can be doused.
The kind of formal game-theoretic argument that I use here has been developed and used by others in related areas (Rubinstein, 1989; Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998; Baliga and Sjostrom, 2002) . The novelty of the paper lies in the context. The use of Bayes-Nash equilibrium to analyze racial conflict seems to be the natural choice but is rarely used in the literature. The aim of this paper is to propose and Tagore, arguing against nationalism. For a moving commentary on how nationalism can be put to venal use and give rise to "collective psychosis" see Hedges (2002) .
defend such an analysis and set the stage for analyzing game-theoretically the myriad roles that identity plays in our social and economic lives. It is shown that there are social contexts where racial conflict can get triggered even though most people concerned are bent on avoiding it. Game theory turns out to be a valuable instrument for understanding such social processes.
The use of game theory and strategic equilibrium concepts for understanding social tensions and political conflict occurs in a relatively brief literature (see Bowles, 2003; Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997) . One paper that explicitly uses this method to study political uprising is by Bates, de Figueiredo and Weingast (1998) . In their paper they try to understand the long period of murmuring dissent and the eventual uprising in 1991, which dislodged Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party from power in Zambia. As in our model, critical use is made of incomplete information among the agents. But the similarity ends there, since I am interested in economies where every individual is, in a sense, powerless, and individuals critically use race or other identity markers to from conditional expectations of other people's behavior.
One of the most critical results of this model is how the injection of a few people with special preferences can transform a society in harmony to one in which racial groups are Balkanized and pitted against one another. In particular, the arrival of one new person, aggressively inclined, can transform a peaceful nation into one in which people of two races or religions are pitted against one another (and that is in fact the only equilibrium). Hence, in curing the problem it is important to recognize that a randomlyselected person who is aggressive against another group may have no innate aggressive preference. Hence, this paper resists the view of conflict where the 'other' side is thought of as innately wicked. This is a tendency that has been with us from primitive times to the contemporary-to view those on the other side of the bush as evil 4 .
This tendency has been a major hindrance to understanding conflict and stopping it. And so I hope that this theoretical inquiry will contribute to the design of more effective policy. But, as is discussed later, there is another way in which models of this kind can influence social outcomes. This is by prompting individuals (in contrast to governments and policymakers) to alter their behavior. What textbook economics does not recognize but is true is that human beings have an innate tendency to contribute to public goods and causes even when that is not in their direct self-interest. So, once we understand that a particular behavior of ours can contribute to a public good or a public bad, we are inclined to, respectively, undertake or desist from that behavior. This paper shows that if (1) all of us are a bit more cooperative towards 'others' (that is, people who carry different identity markers) or (2) we refuse to use race or religion to form conditional judgments (even when there is information in race or religion), then the social outcome could dramatically change from bad to good. What I am arguing is that the mere understanding of this logic can prompt individuals to behave as in (1) Recognition at the level of a collectivity can give dignity to a group, as Taylor (1994) has argued effectively. But recognition (in the sense of having the ability to distinguish between individuals or sub-groups) can do more. It can act as a brake in the escalation of identity wars. When a person from a race or religious group X acts aggressively towards another, if the latter can identify the aggressor as belonging to smaller group, for instance a sect of X or a member of X with a specific history, then this act of aggression will not taint his view of everybody of race X and this can be a crucial step in the prevention of escalation of aggression. That one should get to know one's enemy is therefore not just highfalutin moral advice, but a recommendation for peace that has foundation in formal theory. While the paper does not go formally into these larger questions it tries to set the ground for such investigations in the future. Interaction among human beings is described here in terms of a 'basic game', G, described below.
Basic Model

Basic Game, G:
Individuals are drawn randomly from S and matched against one another to play G. The 'payoff' in G should be thought of as direct visible payoffs that players get. For simplicity, we may think of the numbers as dollar payments and these 'payoffs' are common knowledge. The strategies A and C denote "aggressive" and "cooperative"
behavior. The game captures the idea that cooperative behavior leads to desirable outcomes, but people do not like to be cooperative when one's opponent is being aggressive. There are many different interpretations possible for this game. Action A could be an act of violence against the other player and the game could represent people's penchant for hitting back at someone who hits you. Another interpretation, the more widely applicable one, is where C stands for cooperative behavior, for instance, in business, and A stands for cut-throat behavior in business. To be cooperative against a cut-throat is to do badly. If both can be cooperative, they both do well. It would have been possible to use a more elaborate game (as, for instance, in Basu, 2000, Section 4.6) where being cut-throat in business is always in one's atomistic interest, but for the purposes of this paper the additional complication would not add much. In other words, the idea being captured here is in the spirit of Fukuyama's (1996) discussion of how trust among a people can help progress (see, also, Platteau, 2000, section 6.3). In this game, if a group of people can trust one another and play cooperatively, they will earn more and prosper.
In this basic game there are two Nash equilibria (A,A) and (C,C). It can be checked that, not only does (C,C) Pareto dominate (A,A), but (C,C) is dominant
6 . There are game theorists who believe that when of two equilibria one happens to be risk dominant, then that is the outcome that will be selected (Weibull, 1995, p.31) . Though nothing of great significance hinges on this let us here go along with this assumption. In addition, it has been argued by some that players have a tendency to choose the Paretooptimal Nash equilibrium, either because of a focal point argument or the view that preplay communication will lead to that (Platteau, 2000, section 6.4) . In this example risk dominance and Pareto dominance coincide. So from now on we will assume that whenever two players are called upon to play this game and the game is common knowledge, the outcome will be (C,C).
The game that people actually play is however not G because there may be psychic costs and benefits involved in being aggressive and cooperative with different people, over and above the commonly visible payoffs described in G 7 . The actual game that two players i and j, picked at random from S, play is given by G * . Note that if
The d i and d j refer to the psychic payoffs. We will consider different interpretations of these. In this and the next sections it is assumed that these are determined as follows: If both players are of the same visible type (in our current example, race), that is,
Recall c i and c j are to be interpreted as follows: c i is the innate unfriendliness that person i feels towards an alien, that is, someone different from him. If c i = 0, then person i makes no distinction between his own type and an alien. In the present context, he is race blind.
As long as c i < 2, a player prefers to respond to cooperative behavior with cooperation. What I first want to demonstrate is that, even if people have c i < 2, playing aggressively against the other race may be the only rational strategy for them. Expecting aggression from the other side, we respond with aggression; and moreover, given some weak conditions, this is the only expectation (i.e. the expectation of aggression) that can occur in equilibrium. Huge amounts of racial animus can be founded on the most flimsy basis.
If i and j both belong to the same race, clearly there are two Nash equilibria and, in keeping with our assumption, we will expect them to reach the Pareto superior and risk-dominant outcome, namely, (C,C).
7 This general point that the payoffs that are explicitly displayed may not be the actual payoffs perceived by the players, even in a laboratory setting (let alone life) has been discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Andreoni and Samuelson, 2003, and Weibull, 2004 As usual, under such circumstances, the natural equilibrium notion to use is that of Bayes-Nash.
To start with, let me assume that the a priori distribution of latent characteristic in society is independent of the person's race. Let F(c) be the fraction of population with c i c, within each race. By denying a subscript to F, I am assuming that both races have an identical distribution of latent characteristics.
≤
I shall now specify a sufficient condition on F such that, given that condition, the only equilibrium will be one where everybody is aggressive vis-a-vis people of the other race.
In Figure 1 [ Figure 1 here.]
9 In this analysis it is important to distinguish between beliefs and higher-order beliefs (that is, beliefs about the other player's beliefs, and so on). This is of course central to game-theoretic reasoning but, even in It is obvious that an F, where F(2) is virtually equal to 1, can satisfy Assumption 1. Hence Assumption 1 is compatible with a case where virtually no one prefers to be unilaterally aggressive vis-a-vis the other race.
Theorem 1. Given Assumption 1, the only Bayes-Nash equilibrium is one in which, whenever a person is matched to play against a person of a different race, he chooses to be aggressive.
Proof. The proof of this is straightforward. But instead of giving the shortest proof, I
shall give one that has greater transparency and will aid us with some of the discussion that follows. 
sociology, there is a tradition that emphasizes these distinctions (Moore, 1985; Troyer and Younts, 1997) .
This is a slightly incorrect way of writing B's quasi-reaction correspondence since it presumes the probability of each c to be of measure zero and so hides the fact that when Since the two races are assumed to be identical, W's quasi-reaction correspondence, E'F'J'K is symmetric to B's quasi-reaction correspondence.
[ Figure 2 here.]
ϕ is the proportion of Blacks who are aggressive, we can use W's quasireaction correspondence to read the proportion of Whites who will be aggressive. For B w ϕ ϕ , to be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, each must give rise to the other. That is, they must satisfy (1) and
Given Assumption 1, the only point where this can happen is K in Figure 2 , that is when all Blacks and all Whites choose to be aggressive towards the other race. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ~
The intuition behind the theorem is this. Consider a society in which there are two groups and no one wants, innately, to be aggressive towards members of the other group, though, like in all coordination or assurance games, if the likelihood of the other person being aggressive towards you is high then you will respond with aggression. How likely the other person's aggression has to be to provoke aggression by you, however, differs from person to person. In a large society the distribution of this parameter can be quite smooth, going from those who need very little likelihood to provoke them to those who need a very high likelihood. Now suppose this society has a few additional persons who are innately aggressive (that is, aggression is their dominant strategy). Now, this will mean that those individuals, who are prone to being aggressive if there is a small chance of aggression by their opponent, will now be aggressive (since people use groupconditional expectations when calculating the probability of aggression on the part of the other player). But once these people choose to be aggressive, others, who needed less provocation to be aggressive, might want to be aggressive. And once these people choose to be aggressive, those who needed even less provocation may choose to be aggressive.
And so on. Cooperative behavior vanishes like a trail of collapsing dominos.
If we are free to consider other kinds of F (that is, we are not restricted by Assumption 1), it is easy to see that there may be other Bayes-Nash equilibria. One such case is illustrated in Figure 3 .
[ Figure 3 here.]
In this case there are three possible equilibria, of which two are stable -at 0 and K. I use the word 'stability' in the sense in which it is used in phase diagram analysis.
Suppose the society is in equilibrium U (in figure 3) . Hence, x (y) is the proportion of Blacks (Whites) who are aggressive. These proportions are mutually compatible, U being an equilibrium. But now suppose a few additional Blacks act aggressive (by mistake or because of some exogenous shock). That is x moves slightly to the right. We can see from W's quasi-reaction correspondence that some more W's will now choose to be aggressive. And this, in turn, will make many more B's choose aggression (one can read this off B's reaction correspondence). The process leads inexorably to point K. It is in this sense that U is thought of as unstable and K and 0 stable.
If the society is at 0, then there is no inter-racial animosity. However, as must be evident from the Figure 
Innate and Ex Post Racism
One important way in which the above model can be generalized is to take away race-consciousness from everybody excepting the person(s) whose latent characteristic exceeds 2. What I mean is this. Suppose, for every person whose psychic cost, c i , exceeds 2, (that is, those who prefer to be aggressive irrespective of how the other player plays), the cost occurs, as before, only across racial lines (that is, only when the other player is of a different race), but for everybody whose latent characteristic or psychic cost is less than 2 this cost occurs no matter whom he is playing against. That is, c i (the unseen cost of being cooperative) occurs in these people no matter who they are playing against. In other words, everybody except the few people who had a dominant preference for aggressive play against other races now are totally race blind.
It is easy to see that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium remains exactly as described above (assuming assumption 1 holds). People are always nasty across racial lines.
Racial identity in this model emerges from virtually no race-identity variable in people's utility functions. The word 'virtually' is important because some innate identity preference is needed (in this example, we assume this is true for a few extreme people)
for the balkanization of society to occur.
There is another possible modification which will illustrate how a quasi- Bayes-Nash equilibrium will have the following feature: Blacks choose action A against Whites and Blacks, and Whites choose action A against Blacks. We can have a BayesNash equilibrium which has this property and, in addition, has Whites playing cooperatively against Whites, which is not just Nash but risk dominant. This mimics the kind of colonial control the world witnessed in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the colonial rulers acted cooperatively to control large native populations that were divisive and full of atomistic opportunism among themselves. In this case, the race-based behavior occurs though people have completely race-neutral preferences.
Idiosyncratic Information, Cultural Traps and Secret Societies
The model can, potentially be extended in many directions.
4.1
The assumption that human beings have some characteristics that are invisible and some that are visible (with the implicit assumption that these are visible to all) overlooks the other realistic possibility, where people have characteristics that are idiosyncratically visible, that is, visible to some and not to others. Consider a case where people know one another within their own racial groups, but cannot distinguish between individuals in the other racial group.
In other words, if person i, who is White, is aggressive to a White person, the information that registers in the latter's head is not simply that "one White person was aggressive to me" but "person i from the set of Whites was aggressive to me". On the other hand if person i, who is Black, were aggressive to the same White person, the information that registers in his head is that "a Black person was aggressive to me".
Since in the formal model here one does not learn about persons or races through one's actual experience (but carries probabilistic information in one's head, which is valid, in equilibrium), the observation in the previous paragraph cannot be formalized directly. One route for doing this, is to ask how one would, within the framework of this model, formalize a remark like "when Jack sees i, who is Black, Jack recognizes exactly who he is, instead of treating him as just one Black." Since, in this model the only latent variable is c i , a reasonable way to interpret the remark, "Jack recognizes person i," is to treat it as equivalent to "Jack knows the value of c i. "
What then would "recognizing sub-groups" mean? Suppose among Whites, there are two sub-groups, Croats and Serbs. Let us suppose that the distributions of the latent characteristic among Serbs, Croats and all of them pooled together are given by F s , F c , and F. Then, one way to interpret "recognition of the groups Serbs and Croats" is to say that when Jack sees a Serb, Jack knows that the person is drawn from F s .
Whether one uses this or some other method to formalize this, the idea of 'recognizing faces or sub-groups' is evidently an important one that deserves formalization in the future. Such an analysis could provide a formal basis to the oft-heard recommendation that to control ethnic or racial conflict (Varshney, 2002) it is important for people to 'get to know' the other side. The reason why this works may not be quite the same as what prompts this advice, which often has to do with how knowing someone fosters warmth and affection. The conjecture here is that if we know the other side, we are able to think of one act of aggression as an act of aggression by one particular person or a sub-group, instead of an aggression by a race or an entire ethnic group. This can prevent conflicts from cascading out of hand.
This can be combined with another interesting idea on partial information.
Suppose a person's latent characteristic is not altogether latent, but instead a person emits an imperfect signal to the viewer, as in Morris and Shin (1998) However, it seems likely that if assumption 1 holds and 0 is above a certain size, then the only equilibrium will be the aggressive one. What will be interesting is to introduce the modification that the signal received depends on who the recipient of the signal is. If the recipient happens to be someone who knows the player well, then the 0 will be small.
This may be an interesting route to explore in modeling the possibility of people knowing one another differentially.
4.2
Much has been written about cultural traps, why people fall into certain stereotypical behavior patterns even though that may not seem to yield any benefit (Swidler, 1986; Wilson, 1987) 11 . As Swidler (1986, p. 275) quizzes, "Why doesn't a member of the "culture of poverty" [....] take advantage of opportunities to assimilate to the dominant culture in conduct and dress, acquire the appropriate educational credentials, and settle down to a steady job?" One way to answer this is to argue how human preferences can vary and, interestingly, there can be a self-fulfilling element in this. Once one recognizes oneself as belonging to a certain group one develops a preference for the symbols of that group.
But by using the structure of analysis developed in this paper one can also argue that even when people's preferences remain unchanged and they would prefer to be in the shoes of the other race, they may not wish to exercise the option of changing their culture. The argument I am suggesting here has much to do with 'recognition' (Taylor, 1994 Overall he will be worse off. Hence, Blacks choosing Green and Whites choosing Blue will persist.
The anthropologist, M.N. Srinivas, coined the term 'sanskritization' (Srinivas, 1955) to denote the conscious change in culture that some lower caste groups in India affected in order to get some of the advantages of the upper castes, and also noted why this phenomenon was not more widespread. This had much to do with the opprobrium one faced for attempting to be different (see Basu, 1989) . Not surprisingly, the successful cases of sanskritization were often associated with groups that migrated to and started life afresh in a new locale.
4.3
There are other interesting phenomena that this model can be used to address. The world has seen, mercifully not too often, the emergence and flourishing of 'secret societies'. By a 'secret society' I mean a group of people who know that they belong to a special group-let me call this group S-but the larger society to which they belong is unaware that they share a separate (and among-them known) group identity. host of analytical possibilities that will be worth studying in the future.
Comment on Policy
Despite the abstract character of the paper, its main motivation is to help us craft policy to diffuse racial and other identity-based tensions and turmoil. The first step towards this is to understand the politics of identity and how identity, through the simple mechanism of individuals using statistical information and group characteristics to form expectations about the behavior of individuals, can come to acquire certain malignancies.
13 At times the infiltration is less than perfect. At one stage the KGB presence in the U.S. was so deep that it was advised that if you suspected anybody to be a KGB agent, you should immediately call the CIA headquarters. But, as a late-night talk-show host warned, "Do not be surprised if the same person answers your call."
Innocuous differences turn into significant markers for which people are willing to die.
To prevent this from happening we need to desist from certain individually-rational behaviors, just as one way to control pollution is for us to behave socially responsibly and desist from smoking in a crowded waiting room and discarding plastic bags carelessly.
Such behavior may not be individually rational, but civil society relies on the fact that once human beings realize that certain actions on their part entail minor individual sacrifices but lead to large social gains, they somehow develop those behavior traits as reflexive action.
Though this is contrary to standard wisdom in economics, understanding and appreciating the positive or negative externalities of our individual actions often encourages us to undertake the actions with greater or diminished zest even if this were contrary to one's self-interest. People are often persuaded to switch off the light when leaving a room by being made aware that if everybody was careless about this, the whole country could suffer an electricity shortage. Good citizens do not throw garbage out of their car windows, even if in their perception that makes no difference, simply because of the awareness that if everybody threw garbage out onto the streets that would make the city unclean 14 .
Hence, a better understanding of a phenomenon and our miniscule role in that can have a policy impact (even though this may imply a violation of the textbook rationality principle). If we realize that the other side is not innately evil and that our own tendency to form race-conditional expectations of other people contributes to conflict, we are likely to resist this tendency, even though each of us may individually benefit by using raceconditional expectations.
Moreover, the model developed in this paper shows how a tiny change in our preference (everybody's or even one or two persons') can make a big difference 15 .
Hence, this gives government and civil society some hints on how to 'educate' people.
The recognition of this externality problem also gives rise to the scope for within- of their color or creed, to have a leadership that reflects a nation's diversity, and to have appropriately designed territorial and federal structures (Horowitz, 1985; Bardhan, 2005, Chapter 9 ). But it may be inadequate to stop at these conventional interventions. Also these conventional policies may be more costly than the some of the one that get prompted by the model of this paper. For one, the stress in this paper has been on resolution of conflict by trying to alter the equilibrium, rather than to sustain a disequilibrium outcome through continued structural intervention.
In essence, this paper suggests a way of thinking about racial conflict or the clash of civilizations, which is at variance with popular thinking. On conservative radio and television channels one often hears remarks like: "The trouble with the 'other' community or religious group is that no one in that community expresses outrage against extremism and fundamentalism." Underlying statements of this type is the presumption that the 'other community' is somehow different. The present paper, on the other hand, suggests that a more useful approach is to begin from the presumption that large groups are, at a sufficiently fundamental level, similar. So faced with a special problem or behavior trait of a community or religious group, the right approach is to inquire into what it is in the circumstances or experience of the group that makes them behave in that way. In other words, we are likely to be more successful if we seek the explanation, ultimately, in the equilibrium behavior (which may require us to go several steps back into previous experience), rather than in innate differences. 
